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CRIMINAL LAW& PROCEDURE - PRISONER 
 
Summary 
 
In an appeal from a district court order granting a pretrial petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus and dismissing a charge for possession of an item commonly used to escape, the Court 
determined whether NRS 212.093(1) encompasses a prohibition on cell phones. 
 
Disposition/Outcome   
 
NRS 212.093(1) does not prohibit county jail inmates from possessing cell phones. 
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
While Nickolas Mark Andrews was in custody at Pershing Countyjail, officers 
discovered a cell phone hidden in a box beneath Andrews’ bed.  The State charged Andrews 
under NRS 212.093(1), which in pertinent part, prohibits prisoners from possessing “any key, 
picklock, bolt cutters, wire cutters, saw, digging tool, rope, ladder, hook or any other tool or item 
adapted, designed, or commonly used for he purpose of escaping” from custody.   
 
Andrews filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that NRS 212.093(1) is 
unconstitutionally vague and overbroad and, by its terms, does not prohibit possession of cell 
phones.  The Sixth Judicial District Court agreed with Andrews, granted a pretrial petition for a 
writ of habeas corpus, and dismissed the charge.  The Nevada Supreme Court took the State’s 
appeal.  
 
Discussion 
 
Justice Saitta wrote the opinion for the unanimous three-justice panel.  The Nevada 
Supreme Court declined to determine the constitutionality of NRS 212.093(1).  Instead, the 
Court deemed it only necessary to determine whether the plain language of the statute justified 
the district court’s order. 
 
 The Court acknowledged that while NRS 212.093(1) prohibits prisoners from possessing 
the expressly listed items (e.g., picklock, bolt cutters, ladder), the statute also includes a catchall 
provision that prohibits prisoners from possessing any other device that is “adapted, designed or 
commonly used for the purpose of escaping.”  However, the Court disagreed with the State and 
concluded that the scope of the catchall provision did not encompass cell phones.   
 
 In making this determination, the Court looked at the statute as a whole and found that 
the aim of the statute is to prohibit the possession of devices used to forcibly break out of or 
physically flee from a jail cell.  The Court noted that “it would be virtually impossible to use a 
cell phone to forcibly break out of, or physically flee from, a jail cell.”   
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 The Court then compared the State’s “overambitious” interpretation of NRS 212.093(1) 
to a statutory interpretation argued for in Puglisi v. State.
2
  In that case, the statute in question, 
NRS 205.080, prohibited the possession of any tool commonly used for burglary.  The Court in 
Puglisi reasoned that a souvenir-type shopping bag, although capable of being used for the 
commission of burglary, was not encompassed within the scope of NRS 205.080 because 
“trouser pockets, pocket books, coat sleeves, girdles, and Adidas” could also be arguably used 
for burglary, yet the statute does not encompass them.  Using the same reasoning of Puglisi, the 
Court explained that although a cell phone could arguably be used to assist in an escape as is 
could be used to help enlist a third party to provide a getaway ride, so too could “virtually any 
item—even shoes or spectacles.”  The Court stated that if the State’s argument were credited, 
then practically any item could fall within the scope of the statute. 
 
 The Court then stated that its conclusion was further bolstered by reference to NRS 
212.165(3), which provides that an inmate in state prison “shall not, without lawful authorization, 
possess or have in his or her custody or control a portable telecommunications device.”  Based 
on this statute, which speaks solely of state prison (i.e., not county jail, which is what Andrews 
was in), the Court reasoned that the Legislature “clearly knows how to prohibit inmates from 
possessing cell phones but did not do so with respect to county jail inmates.”  The Court 
concluded that the distinction between the two statutes leads to the inference that the 
Legislature’s omission of cell phones in NRS 212.093(1) was deliberate.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The district court order dismissing the statutory charge against Andrews was affirmed. 
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